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THE CHINESE CONTROL YUAN:
AN INDEPENDENT SUPERVISORY ORGAN
OF THE STATE
HERBERT HAN-PAO MA*
In recent years, quite a number of articles on the Scandinavian
censorial institution of the Ombudsman have appeared in English-
language publications.' In 1961, the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review published three articles about this institution,2 in one of which
an American professor made serious suggestions for a similar office
for the United States.3 The purpose of this article is to introduce
Western readers to the Control Yuan of the Republic of China. Al-
though similar in purpose to the Ombudsman, the Control Yuan is a
unique supervisory organ with roots in modern Chinese constitutional
theory and in the traditional Chinese censorial administrative system.
* Associate Professor of Law, National Taiwan University, Taiwan, Republic
of China.
1. Hurwitz, The Danish Parliamentary Commission for Civil and Military
Government Administration, 1958 PuB. L. 236; Hurwitz, Denmark's Ombusman:
The Parliamentary Commission for Civil and Military Government Administra-
tion, 1961 Wis. L. Rnv. 169; Biom-Cooper, An Ombudsman in Britain?, 1960
PuB. L. 145; Hurwitz, The Danish Ombudsman and His Office, 63 THE LISTENER
835 (1960); Pedersen, The Danish Parliamentary Commissioner in Action, 1959
PuB. L. 115; CHAPMAN, THE PROFESSION OF GOVERNMENT ch. 12 (1959); Abraham,
A People's Watchdog Against Abuse of Power, 20 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 152 (1960);
Anderman, The Swedish Justitie Ombudsran, 11 AM. J. CoMP. L. 225 (1962).
2. Davis, Ombudsmen in America: Officers to Critize Administration Action,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 1057 (1961); JMigerskibld, The Swedish Ombudsman, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 1077 (1961); Christensen, The Danish Ombudsman, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 1100 (1961).
3. Davis, note 2 supra.
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I. THE BASIC THEORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION
A. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Political Doctrines
The Constitution of the Republic of China is based on the "demarca-
tion of political and administrative powers" and the "separation of
five powers" as laid down by the Father of the Republic, Dr. Sun
Yat-sen. Although the present Constitution was promulgated in 1947,
various drafts based on this theory had been drawn, beginning in 1928.
Dr. Sun believed that government should be all-powerful, but never-
theless controlled by the people. For this reason he distinguished the
people's powers for controlling the government, which he called
"political powers" from the government's powers, called the "admin-
istrative powers." The people's political powers are four in number:
election, recall, initiative and referendum. With the powers of elec-
tion and recall, the people can control the personnel of the government.
With the powers of initiative and referendum, the people can con-
trol legislation. The government's powers are five in number: the
executive power, the legislative power, the judicial power, the power
of examination and the censorial or control power.
Dr. Sun adopted a five-power theory of government because he
thought that China's traditional systems of civil service examinations
and of censorship could remedy defects he had observed in Montes-
quieu's theory of separation of three powers as adopted by the West-
ern democracies. He believed that the major defects of the Western
three-power system arise from vesting the power of examination in
the executive department, and the power of censorship and impeach-
ment in the legislature. It seemed to him that the election system
was often unable to get able and honest men, and the power of civil
examination as a corrective would have the same ill results as the
"spoils system," if entrusted to the executive department. He there-
fore proposed that independence be given to the power of civil exam-
ination so that all candidates for public offices, elective as well as ap-
pointive, must first prove themselves qualified by examinations. He
was convinced that if the censorial power were in the hands of the
legislature, it would be abused when the parliamentary majority was
not in power in government, and purposely neglected when the parlia-
mentary majority was in power in government. Besides, if the legis-
lature concurrently exercised the power of censorship and impeach-
ment, the resulting strife would impede the legislative function.
4. For a concise introduction to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's political doctrine see Tsui
SHU-CHIN, SAN MiN CHU I HsIN LuN [NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE THREE
PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE chs. 13-15 (4th ed. Taipei 1959)].
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B. The Control Yuan and the Five-Power ConstitutionP
The political system in the Chinese Constitution is unique in many
respects. The four political powers of the people are exercised in the
Central Government by the National Assembly, composed of delegates
of the whole body of citizens, elected by universal, equal and direct
suffrage, and by secret ballot.6 The present constitution deviates
somewhat from Dr. Sun's theory by providing for initiative and refer-
endum only for constitutional amendments, not for ordinary legisla-
tion, and limiting election and recall to the offices of President and
Vice President.7 The five administrative powers of government are
vested in five independent departments called the five "Yuan"; hence
the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the
Examination Yuan and the Control Yuan. For this reason, the Chinese
Constitution is generally known as the "Five-Power Constitution."
The Control Yuan, which independently exercises the power of censor-
ship and impeachment, is on an equal level with the other four "Yuan."
However, Dr. Sun Yat-sen emphasized that the five powers, though
separated, are not unrelated. The purpose of separating the exercise
of the five powers is to achieve co-ordination and not to check each
other."
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CHINESE CONTROL SYSTEM
The Chinese control system has a long history, a brief survey of
which is essential to the understanding of the present Control Yuan.9
As early as the Ch'in (221-206 B.C.) and Han (206 B.C.-220 A.D.)
Dynasties a group of officials with the title of Yii Shih were appointed
by the emperor and charged with supervising and controlling members
of the Central Government. In the provinces there were officials with
similar functions. However, in those days the Yii Shih was under the
chief executive official, Ch'eng Hsiang. It was not until after the Wei
(A.D. 220-264) and Tsin (A.D. 265-420) Dynasties that the office of
Yii Shih was separated from the executive functions of the govern-
5. For an explanation in English of the Chinese Constitution see HsIml KWAN-
SHENG, A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION (Taipei 1954).
6. The Constitution of the Republic of China (hereinafter cited as CoNSTrrTU-
TION) arts. 25, 129. An English translation of the Constitution is found in the
CHINA YEAR BOOK 1960-1961 at 878 (1961).
7. CONSTITUTION art. 27. Besides, The National Assembly can also by resolu-
tion alter the territory of the Republic of China. CONSTITUTION art. 4.
8. Tsui SHU-CHIN, supra note 4, at 204.
9. Another note of interest is that while the present Control Yuan is com-
posed of a rather large number of members, the control officials of old days were
only a few in number and in this respect they resembled the Scandinavian
Ombudsman. It is also interesting to note a resemblance, to some extent, be-
tween old China's control officials and the antecedents of the Swedish Ombuds-
man. Jligerskild, supra note 2, at 1078-79.
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ment and given increased independent power of supervision and con-
trol. Beginning with the Tang Dynasty (A.D. 618-907) the power of
control was exercised by two classes of officials. The Yi Shih T'ai were
responsible for the supervision of the Central Government including
the office of Ch'eng Hsiang, and the Chien Yi Ta Fu were advisers
and critics of the emperor himself. In the provinces the Control Com-
missioners conducted investigations and reported cases of impeach-
ment to the Central Government, either openly or confidentially. The
Sung Dynasty (A.D. 960-1279) generally followed the Tang system.
During the Ming (A.D. 1368-1643) and Ch'ing (A.D. 1644-1911)
Dynasties, the names of the Central Government control officials were
changed, but their nature and functions remained essentially the same.
The officials charged with supervision and control of local govern-
ment were increased in number.
The powers of the traditional Chinese control officials, Yii Shih,
could roughly be classified as follows: (1) to make recommendations
on political affairs, (2) to impeach, (3) to investigate executive func-
tions, (4) to investigate officials (both civil and military), (5) to
preside or sit at the trial of serious crimes, (6) to defend and clear the
innocent, (7) to inspect accounts, (8) to send and file dissenting opin-
ions on the edicts of the emperor or of the state, (9) to destroy docu-
ments and (10) to supervise ceremonies. 10 It is obvious that the
powers of Yi Shih were therefore very extensive, overlapping the
administrative as well as the judicial powers.
While it is true that in old China the censorial officials were only
subordinates of the emperor, they were usually men of high repute,
integrity and outstanding achievement in literature and politics.
Most of them had a keen sense of responsibility and justice. Not only
did they unhesitatingly censure influential officials, they would even
risk position and life by attempting to correct the emperor himself if
the latter deviated from righteousness. On the other hand, the emperor
often either approved of their loyalty to duty or pardoned their an-
tagonism. Execution or punishment of a censorial official was gener-
ally recognized as a most unwise thing for an emperor to do. Chinese
political history abounds in heroic acts of these censorial officials, and
accounts are still familiar to and highly regarded by the Chinese peo-
ple. It was this sense of integrity and unwavering will to maintain
law and discipline that Dr. Sun sought to preserve and develop in the
Control Yuan.:" Western scholars have been loud in their praises of
the Chinese censorial system. 2
10. CHINA YEAR BOOK 1960-1961 at 145 (1961).
11. DR. SuN YAT-SEN'S TEACHINGS: LECTURES 63; Tsui SHU-CHIN, supra note
4, at 199.
12. See, e.g., BURGESS, RECONCILIATION OF GOVERNMENT WITH LIBERTY (1915).
See also Tsui SHU-CHIN, supra note 4, at 200.
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III. OUTLINE OF THE CONTROL YUAN
The Chinese Control Yuan as an independent supervisory organ
is Dr. Sun Yat-sen's ingenious invention. In order that American
readers may have a clear idea of the institution, it seems appropriate
to describe in some detail its structure, functions, powers and work
performed.
A. The Structure of the Control Yuan
1. Members of the Control Yuan
The Control Yuan is composed of elective members who act as
representatives of the people in exercising the power of control. Ac-
cording to Art. 9 of the Constitution, the members of the Control Yuan
are elected by the provincial and municipal councils, the local councils
of Mongolia and Tibet, and Chinese nationals residing abroad in the
following numbers: five from each province, two from each munici-
pality under the direct jurisdiction of the National Government, eight
from the Mongolian Leagues and Banners, eight from Tibet and
eight from Chinese nationals residing abroad.
The total maximum membership of the Control Yuan is 223, but
owing to extraordinary circumstances on the China Mainland from
1947 to 1949, immediately after the Constitution was promulgated,
only 180 members had been elected by 1949 and of these elected mem-
bers, many have died and some were left on the Mainland. The mem-
bership in 1961 was 85. The members of the Control Yuan are elected
as representatives of territories and overseas Chinese bodies, not as
those of professions and races. However, feminine membership is
guaranteed by law in that there must be a woman among the five
members elected from each province.13 Such protection for feminine
membership is widely used in the Chinese Constitution.14 The alloca-
tion of membership is not determined in proportion to population,
being in this respect similar to the election system of upper house
members of Western parliaments, especially the United States Senate.
Members of the Control Yuan serve for six years and are eligible for
reelection.25 They may not concurrently hold a public office or engage
13. Law Governing the Election and Recall of Control Yuan Members, art. 10,
GENERAL COLLECTION OF CURRENT LAWS AND ORDINANCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 3186 (1952). (Hereinafter cited as COLLECTION.)
14. Law Governing the Election and Recall of National Assembly Delegates,
art. 4; Law Governing the Election and Recall of Legislative Yuan Members,
art. 55.
15. CONSTITUTION art. 93.
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in any professional practice 6 in the broadest sense of the terms."
Such severe restrictions are imposed in order that the members of the
Control Yuan may not let personal interests frustrate their duties. On
the other hand, members of the Control Yuan are provided with a
guarantee of independence and freedom from interference in the
exercise of their powers in that they cannot be held responsible out-
side the Yuan for opinions expressed or votes cast in the Yuan.18
Nor may they be arrested or detained without the permission of the
Control Yuan except in cases of flagrante delicto.1" However, a mem-
ber of the Control Yuan may be recalled after six months in office by
that body of people which elected him.20
2. President and Vice President
The Control Yuan has a President and a Vice President who are
elected by and from among its members. 21
3. Control Yuan Council
The Control Yuan's central organ is the Control Yuan Council,
which is composed of the President and the Vice President and the
members of the Yuan, and meets monthly with the President as
Chairman.22 The Vice President, or in his absence an elected Chair-
man, may preside in the absence of the President. 23 A quorum is
formed when more than one fifth 7of the members are present. Except
as otherwise provided by the Constitution,24 adoption of a resolution
must be by a majority of the members present. But the annual meet-
ing in May, which is held for a review of the work done, must be
attended by at least one third of all the members. 25
16. CONSTITUTION art. 103.
17. According to the interpretations of the Council of Grand Justices, the
office in charge of the interpretation of the Constitution, members of the Control
Yuan are barred from serving as officials of or popular representatives in the
Central Government or local governments, as directors or supervisors of public or
privately run enterprises, and from practising as lawyers, accountants, engineers,
doctors, etc. To Fa Kuan Hui I Chieh Shih (Interpretations of Council of Grand
Justices, SHIm TzE Nos. 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 81).
18. CONSTITUTION art. 101.
19. CONSTITUTION art. 102.
20. Law Governing the Election and Recall of Control Yuan Members arts.
14, 15, supra note 13, at 3186.
21. CONSTITUTION art. 92.
22. Organic Law of the Control Yuan art. 7, COLLECTION 3177 (1947).
23. Rules of the Control Yuan Council art. 4, supra note 13, at 3186.
24. A majority of the whole body of members is needed to impeach the Presi-
dent or Vice President, CONSTITUTION art. 100.
25. Rules of the Control Yuan Council art. 3, supra note 13, at 3186.
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4. Committees
A number of committees are set up to investigate the activities of
the Executive Yuan and its various Ministries and Commissions with
a view to ascertaining whether or not they are guilty of violation of
law or neglect of duty.28 Each member may serve on two committees,
and each committee may have a maximum of thirty members. At
present there are ten committees, namely: domestic affairs, foreign
affairs, national defense, finance, economic affairs, education, com-
munication, judicial affairs, territorial affairs and overseas Chinese
affairs.27
5. Regional Control Offices
The Control Yuan may, in case of necessity, divide the country into
zones and establish Regional Control Offices.28 This is to enable the
exercise of the control power to reach the various parts of the country
and is patterned after the traditional system of Control Commis-
sioners in the provinces. Before the retreat to Taiwan in 1949, thir-
teen Regional Control Offices were established with three commis-
sioners in each of them.
6. Ministry of Audit
The Ministry of Audit is a part of the Control Yuan. The Minister
of Audit or Auditor General is nominated and appointed by the Presi-
dent of the Republic with the consent of the Legislative Yuan.29
Under the Auditor General are a Vice Auditor General and ten to
twelve Auditors.30
B. The Functions and Powers of the Control Yuan
The Constitution explicitly provides that the Control Yuan is the
highest supervisory organ of the state and exercises the powers of
consent, impeachment, censure and auditing.31 In addition, on the
basis of the investigations and resolutions of its committees, it may
also propose corrective measures to the government. 32 We shall deal
with these powers of the Control Yuan separately.
26. CONSTITUTION art. 96.
27. Organic Law of The Committees of the Control Yuan arts. 2, 3, supra
note 22, at 3177.
28. Organic Law of The Control Yuan art. 8, supra note 22, at 3177.
29. CONSTITUTION art. 104.
30. Organic Law of the Ministry of Audit arts. 4, 5, COLLECTION 3180 (1949).
31. CONSTITUTION art. 90.
32. CONSTITUTION art. 97.
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1. Impeachment
The power to impeach originated in the ancient office of Yii Shih.
In the present Constitution it is the most important of all the powers
exercised by the Control Yuan.
(1) Scope of Impeachment Power-The scope of the power of
impeachment of the Control Yuan is as extensive as that given Con-
gress in the United States Constitution. The President and Vice Pres-
ident of the Republic, public functionaries of the Central Government
and local governments, and personnel of the Judicial Yuan and of
the Examination Yuan, are all subject to impeachment.23 However,
representatives of the people, such as members of the Legislative
Yuan and of the Control Yuan, delegates of the National Assembly
and members of provincial, municipal and county assemblies are not
included34
The meaning of "the personnel of the Judicial Yuan" if interpreted
in accordance with the Articles 77, 79 and 81 of the Constitution,
would cover the Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan, Judges of the
Supreme Court and the Administrative Court, and Members of the
Committee on the Discipline of Public Functionaries, as well as the
Judges of all high courts and district courts.
(2) Grounds for Impeachment-The United States Constitution
regards treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors as
reasons for impeachment.3 Under the Chinese Constitution, the
common grounds for the Control Yuan to institute an impeachment
against the various objects mentioned above are neglect of duty and
violation of law.-
(3) Procedure of Impeachment-The procedure of impeachment is
of two parts, namely, the institution and the trial. In Western democ-
33. CONSTITUTION arts. 97, 99, 100. The term "public functionaries" is found
in various kinds of Chinese laws aside from the Constitution. However, there
exists no unified interpretation as to what kinds of persons are covered by this
term. Hence the often raised question whether military personnel are included de-
pends largely upon the law in which the term appears. As far as those parts of
the Constitution having to do with the power of the Control Yuan and its re-
lated organizations are concerned, there are three articles (arts. 97, 98, 77) con-
taining the term "public functionaries." Unfortunately they fail to tell whether
military personnel are implied by the term, and on this constitutionalists are
divided in opinion. Theoretically, both civil servants and military personnel should
be brought under the power of the Control Yuan in order to achieve unity. In
practice the Control Yuan does exercise its supervisory powers over military
personnel. The only thing that stands in the way of unity is that military
personnel charged with a disciplinary offense are tried by different authorities
and in accordance with a different set of disciplinary rules. See note 46 supra.
34. Interpretation of Council of Grand Justices, SHIH TzE No. 14.
35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
36. CONSTITUTION arts. 97, 99.
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racies the power to institute an impeachment rests with the legisla-
ture and usually with the lower house if the legislative body is bi-
cameral. The power to try a case of impeachment belongs to either
the upper house of the legislative body, as is the case of the United
States, 3 the Supreme Court or Court of Cassation, as is the case of
Belgium,38 or a special court, as is the case of Sweden and Denmark.-9
In China, the power to institute an impeachment is entrusted solely to
the Control Yuan; but the procedural requirements for instituting an
impeachment and the office for trying a case of impeachment differ
with the object of impeachment. An impeachment of the President or
the Vice President of the Republic must be proposed by more than
one fourth of the members of the Control Yuan and endorsed, after
due consideration, by the majority of all the members. It must then
be presented to the National Assembly for trial.4 It should be noted
in this connection that the National Assembly, besides having the
power to recall the President or the Vice President of the Republic
on its own initiative, may also try a case of impeachment of the
President or the Vice President of the Republic, instituted by resolu-
tion of the Control Yuan.4 1 The National Assembly may conduct the
trial either at its regular session, which is held once every six years,4 2
or at an extraordinary session convened for such a purpose,43 and,
by a resolution of more than two thirds of the delegates present,
an impeachment may be passed whereupon the President or the Vice
President shall have to vacate his office.44 On the other hand, an
impeachment of a public functionary in the Central Government, in-
cluding the Judicial Yuan and the Examination Yuan, or in a local
government, may be instituted upon the proposal of one or more
members of the Control Yuan, with the concurrence after due con-
sideration of no less than nine other members.45 The case will then be
referred for trial to the Judicial Yuan's Committee on the Discipline
of Public Functionaries. " In no case may the President of the Control
37. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3.
38. BELGIAN CONST. art. 90.
39. In Sweden, the Rigsr.tt (SWEDISH CONST. art. 102); in Denmark, the
Rigsret (DANISH CONST. arts. 59, 60).
40. CONSTITUTION art. 100.
41. CONSTITUTION art. 27; Law Governing the Election and Recall of the
President and the Vice President arts. 10, 12.
42. CONSTITUTION arts. 29, 47.
43. CONSTITUTION art. 30.
44. Law Governing the Election and Recall of the President and Vice Presi-
dent arts. 10, 12, CoLLEcTIoN 25 (1947).
45. CONSTITUTION arts. 98, 99.
46. Control Law art. 9; Law for the Discipline of Public Functionaries art. 10,
COLLECTION 3055 (1948). If the impeached happens to be a military officer, the
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Yuan attempt to influence or interfere with the proceedings of im-
peachment.47
It is appropriate here to briefly describe the Committee on the
Discipline of Public Functionaries. The Committee is an organiza-
tion under the Judicial Yuan, composed of nine to fifteen members,
five to seven of whom must be former judges of the selected appoint-
ment rank.48 Headed by a Chairman, the Committee is responsible
for imposing disciplinary punishments on public functionaries guilty
of violation of law or neglect of duty.49 The punishments are of six
grades, namely: dismissal, suspension, demotion, reduction in salary,
demerits and reprimand.50 This committee is charged only with the
power to try cases referred to it by the Control Yuan or other organi-
zations that call for disciplinary measures. It cannot indict on its
own initiative. The trial is ordinarily conducted by brief and the
impeached defendants may be summoned for questioning when the
Committee deems it necessary.51 If, on the other hand, a case of im-
peachment has not been concluded by the Disciplinary Committee
after three months, the Control Yuan may question about it, and
if questioning and investigation reveal intentional procrastination,
the Control Yuan may institute impeachment proceedings against or
censure the culpable officials of the Disciplinary Committee.
Although an impeachment of the President or Vice President of the
Republic is tried by an organization different from that which tries
impeachments of ordinary public functionaries, the punishments im-
posed by both these organizations are limited to disciplinary mea-
sures. Cases involving criminal charges or military criminal law
are subject to the jurisdiction of ordinary courts or military tri-
bunals.5 3 We shall come back to this later.
case is, in practice, referred to a competent military organization to be dealt with
in accordance with a different set of rules called Law for the Discipline of Army,
Navy and Air Force Personnel.
47. Control Law art. 12.
48. Organic Law of the Committee on the Discipline of Public Functionaries
arts. 1, 2, COLLECTION 2857 (1948).
49. Law for the Discipline of Public Functionaries art. 2, supra note 46, at
3055.
50. Law for the Discipline of Public Functionaries art. 3 § 1, supra note 46, at
3055. Suspension, demotion, reduction in salary and demerits do not, however,
apply to political officials, i.e., policy-making officials as contrasted with adminis-
trative officials (Sec. 2 of the same article).
51. Law for the Discipline of Public Functionaries art. 15, supr4 note 46, at
3055.
52. Control Law art. 17. In such a case, who shall try these impeached dis-
ciplinary officials is a question yet to be answered, as it would be impossible for
members of the Disciplinary Committee to try themselves.
53. CoNsTITuTioN art. 52; Control Law art. 15.
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In one respect the Chinese impeachment system is unique. As in-
dicated above, to impeach a Central Government official including
the President of a Yuan, all that is required is the proposal of one
Control Yuan member, endorsed by nine others. This procedure
is markedly more simple than the systems of other countries.
2. Censure
When a public functionary is suspected of law violation or neglect
of duty that makes the immediate termination of his duties necessary,
a member of the Control Yuan may first file a written censure which,
after having been confirmed by no less than three other members, will
be forwarded to the superior of the functionary. If the alleged offense
is against criminal or military law, the case must be referred to the
appropriate court for action." Pending court proceedings the superior
of the functionary in question must take appropriate action in ac-
cordance with the provisions in the Law for the Discipline of Public
Functionaries 55 within one month after receipt of the written cen-
sure. He may suspend the functionary from office or take other im-
mediate measures against him. If the superior considers no action
necessary, he must communicate his reasons to the Control Yuan.58
If he takes no action or the action he takes is considered inadequate
by the Control Yuan, the functionary in question may be impeached.
Under such circumstances, when the impeachment proceedings finally
result in the functionary's being punished, his superior will be held
responsible for neglect of duty. 17
While impeachment includes within its scope the President and
Vice President of the Republic, censure is limited to general public
functionaries. Instituting impeachment requires endorsement of no
less than nine members of the Control Yuan, while censure can be en-
dorsed by three members. An impeachment of ordinary public func-
tionaries is referred to the Committee on the Discipline of Public
Functionaries for action, while a case of censure is referred to the
superior of the censured functionary. Thus, it is much quicker and
more effective for the Control Yuan to seek to censure a public
functionary than to impeach him.
3. Corrective Measures
The Control Yuan, on the basis of the investigations and resolutions
of its committees, may propose corrective measures and forward
54. Control Law art. 19.
55. If the functionary is a military officer, he is subject to the Law for the
Discipline of Army, Navy and Air Force Personnel.
56. Control Law art. 21.
57. Control Law art. 22.
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them to the Executive Yuan and the Ministries and Commissions
concerned, directing their attention to effecting improvements. 8
Upon receipt of such a proposal the Executive Yuan or the Ministry
or Commission concerned must immediately take corrective action
and report to the Control Yuan in writing. If a reply is not received
in two months the Control Yuan will make an inquiry.',
There are two points concerning the Control Yuan's power to
propose corrective measures which call for some discussion.
(1) The Scope of Corrective Measures-What kinds of work or
activity of the administrative department of the government are sub-
ject to corrective measures is open to question. It would seem de-
sirable that corrective measures be directed not only towards par-
ticular actions of the government but towards its general policy as
well. Moreover, corrective measures must not be restricted to govern-
ment actions that are in violation of law, but should also include those
that are inappropriate. Only in this way can the Control Yuan
truly help to keep the Government not only clean but effective, too.
(2) The Effect of Corrective Measures-It is quite clear that on
receipt of the Control Yuan's proposal for improvements, the Execu-
tive Yuan or the Ministry or Commission concerned must take actions
to effect such improvements within three months. However, the
Executive Yuan in carrying out a certain policy may take a view
different from that of the Control Yuan as to what actions are "ap-
propriate" or "inappropriate," and the case becomes one of opinion.
Under such circumstances does the Executive Yuan or the Ministry
or Commission concerned have to bow to the Control Yuan's correc-
tive measures? This important problem has yet to be solved.
The power to propose corrective measures is different from the
powers to impeach and to censure; the latter are directed against
"personnel" of the government, the former against the "actions"
of the government. A public functionary in the Central Government
or in a local government, if guilty of violation of law or neglect of
duty, may be impeached or censured, but the decisions or actions for
which he is officially responsible are not necessarily improved. There-
fore, the Control Yuan is given the power to call for improvements.
On the other hand, not infrequently, public functionaries innocent of
violation of law or neglect of duty make decisions so inappropriate as
to be detrimental to public good. Here again it is necessary for the
Control Yuan to propose corrective measures.
Impeachment or a censure is instituted upon the proposal and en-
dorsement of individual members of the Control Yuan. A corrective
58. CONSTITUTION art. 97; Control Law art. 24.
59. Control Law art. 25.
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measure, however, is subject to the investigation and resolution of an
appropriate committee of the Control Yuan. The committees are set
up in accordance with the number and nature of the various Minis-
tries and Commissions of the Executive Yuan, to watch and investi-
gate their activities.6 0 The committees maintain a continuing sur-
veillance of their respective administrative departments.
4. Investigation
The Control Yuan is entrusted by the Chinese Constitution with an
accompanying power of investigation so that the exercise of its con-
trol powers will be facilitated. In exercising its powers of impeach-
ment, censure and proposal of corrective measures, the Control Yuan
may, through its members, committees, regional control offices, other
officials or even other organizations, conduct investigations which
include in particular the examination of the original orders issued
by the organization concerned and all other relevant documents.1 If
necessary, and with the permission of the head of the organization
concerned, the investigators may even take away such documents in
whole or part for a certain period of time. Unless the head of the
organization concerned deems it detrimental to the national interest,
as in the case of national defense and diplomatic secrets, he cannot
reject such a request.6 2 This right of free access to public records in-
evitably raises the question whether the documents of a lawsuit in trial
in an ordinary or military court are also subject to such inspections.
There is no law that exempts these documents from the Control
Yuan's investigations. However, in order to avoid influencing the
judge, it is deemed advisable not to investigate such documents unless
absolutely necessary.63
The Control Yuan's investigations may also require the complainant
and the person under investigation to be present at a designated place
for questioning. 4 Control Yuan investigators, in conducting an in-
vestigation, may call upon the local government or court or other
organizations for help, and may, as the case demands, seek the as-
sistance of civil or military police. 5
The extensiveness of the Control Yuan's power of investigation is
60. CONSTITUTION art. 96.
61. CONSTITUTION art. 95; Control Law arts. 26, 30; Regulations Governing
the Enforcement of Control Law arts. 9, 10, COLLEcTION 3197 (1953).
62. Control Law art. 27.
63. In fact, disputes between the Control Yuan and civil as well as military
courts over the investigation of documents of a case pending decision in a court
have occurred in the past, though rarely.
64. Control Law art. 26.
65. Control Law arts. 28, 29.
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further evidenced by the fact that even private organizations with
their personnel and documents may be brought under the investiga-
tion of the Control Yuan. 8 It is, however, understood that such prac-
tices are justified only when the persons or documents investigated
are involved in a case against a public functionary or government
agency.
In conducting an investigation, the Control Yuan's members or
other designated investigators must present a specially issued identity
card. They must also keep confidential whatever information they
obtainC7 The Control Yuan's power of investigation is designed for
gathering information or evidence concerning the offenses of public
functionaries to be used as grounds for censorial actions. It is there-
fore somewhat different in spirit from the corresponding investiga-
tion power of the United States Congress, which is used to discover
abuses of administrative authority, as well as to determine the need
for new legislation, because the United States Congress usually makes
its investigations through open hearings.
Finally, it should be noted that investigations may be started by
the Control Yuan sua sponte or upon receipt of written complaints
from the people.68 In the latter case, the Control Yuan may refrain
from action if it finds the complaint (1) has nothing to do with a
public functionary or (2) has nothing to do with violation of law or
neglect of duty on the part of a public functionary or (3) contains
accusations vague and anonymous or (4) is not within its jurisdic-
tion.69 In the case of (4) the original complaint should be returned
to the complainant together with reasons.70 However, Control Yuan
members are required by law constantly to make investigations spon-
taneously." All investigations must be concluded within two months.72
5. Consent and Audit
The Chinese Control Yuan is also entrusted with the power of
consent and the power of audit. The President, the Vice President
and the Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan, and the President, the
66. Control Law art. 26.
67. Ibid.
68. Regulations Governing the Enforcement of Control Law art. 11, supra note
61, at 3197.
69. Regulations Governing the Treatment by the Control Yuan of Documents of
Impeachment and Censure and Written Complaints from the People No. 7, COL-
LECTioN 3202 (1952).
70. Id. at No. 6.
71. Regulations Governing the Enforcement of Control Law art. 11, supra
note 61 at 3197.
72. Regulations Governing the Enforcement of Control Law art. 14, supra
note 61 at 3197.
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Vice President and the members of the Examination Yuan are to be
nominated and appointed by the President of the Republic with the
consent of the Control Yuan. 3 For the censorial department to have
the power of consent to appointments of government officials is totally
strange to the traditional Chinese control system. Undoubtedly it is
borrowed from the West and can be best compared to the power of
consent enjoyed by the United States Senate, although the scope of
authority of the latter is much larger.
The Control Yuan exercises the power of audit through the
Ministry of Audit, which takes charge of the following functions:
(1) the supervision of the execution of budgets and the checking of
receipts and disbursements of all government offices; (2) the ex-
amination of budgets and budget statements of all government offices;
(3) the investigation of illegal or dishonest financial practices of all
government offices.74 In Western countries the audit power is al-
most invariably exercised by an office independent of the executive
department of the government, though often responsible to the
parliament. 75 In China the audit power is also vested in an inde-
pendent body called the Ministry of Audit, but it is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Control Yuan. Such an arrangement has its
merits in that if the Ministry discovers any violation of law, neglect
of duty or any irregularities in government financial matters, it can
readily bring the matter to the Control Yuan, which can then impeach
or censure the officials responsible or propose corrective measures to
the organization concerned. The Constitution provides that the Audi-
tor General shall, within three months after the presentation of the
budget statement by the Executive Yuan, complete his audit and
submit a report to the Legislative Yuan.76 The government's budget
is originally examined and approved by the Legislative Yuan. This re-
lationship between the audit power and the Legislative Yuan prob-
ably accounts for the fact that the Auditor General is appointed by
the President of the Republic only with the consent of the Legislative
Yuan.Y
Aside from all these powers, the Control Yuan is further em-
powered to supervise examinations given by the Examination Yuan
or its authorized agency.78
73. CONSTITUTION art. 79, 84.
74. Law of Audit arts. 1-3, COLLECTION 3180 (1949).
75. Great Britain and the United States are two examples.
76. CONSTITUTION art. 105.
77. CONSTITUTION art. 104.
78. Law of the Supervision of Examination art. 1.
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6. A Summary of the Functions and Powers of the Control Yuan
The powers of impeachment and censure are exercised by members
of the Control Yuan or its regional offices. The power of proposing
corrective measures is exercised by members of the Control Yuan or
its regional offices, subject to the examination and resolution of the
committee concerned. The power of investigation may be exercised
by members of the Control Yuan, its committees or its regional offices.
It is worth restating that the Control Yuan may conduct investigations
upon receipt of complaints from private citizens or on the basis of
newspaper reports or materials as well as upon information gained
by its own inspections and inquiries7 9 Ample play is given to the
exercise of the power of investigation, thus providing the Control
Yuan with every possible opportunity to uncover ill practices of pub-
lic functionaries in the execution of law and the performance of their
duties.
C. A Description of the Control Yuan's Exercise of Its Powers
The work actually done by the Control Yuan since the enforcement
of the permanent Constitution in 1947 is quite impressive. Figures
are available for the period from 1947 to the end of October of
1961.80 In that period, there were filed 139 cases of impeachment with
450 officials impeached, and 376 cases of censure with 983 persons
censured. Among the impeachment cases, the impeachment of Vice
President of the Republic Li Tsung-jen in 1952 with his subsequent
recall by the National Assembly in 1954 was outstanding." So was
the impeachment of O.K. Yui, President of the Executive Yuan (an
office often popularly called "Premier"), in 1957, which resulted in
Yui's being reprimanded by the Committee on the Discipline of
Public Functionaries .2 In that same period corrective measures pro-
posed numbered 287. There were 31,221 written complaints received
from private citizens .3 Of these, 5,151 cases were followed by in-
vestigations conducted by the Control Yuan members themselves or
79. Regulations Governing the Enforcement of Control Law arts. 8, 9, supra
note 61, at 3197.
80. Secretariat of the Control Yuan, A Description of the Exercise of the
Control Power by the Control Yuan (1962).
81. For a detailed account of the case see Kuo MIN TA Hui SHiH Lu [2 THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY-A COLLECTION OF ITS PROCEEDINGS AND RELATED DOWu-
MENTS ch. 3 at 165-98 (Nat'l Assembly 1961)].
82. Kung U Yuan Cheng Chieh Wei Yuan Hui I Chiieh Shu [Decision of the
Committee on Discipline of Public Functionaries, CHIEN Tzu No. 2203, January
31 of the 47th year of the Republic of China (1958)].
83. This does not include the figures for the year 1949 because the Control
Yuan's fies of that year were left behind on the China Mainland.
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other designated investigators, and 9,389 cases were followed by in-
vestigations conducted at the request of the Control Yuan by the
organizations involved in the complaints.
In order to have a clearer conception of the Control Yuan's actual
work, let us take the figures for its various kinds of work in the year
from July 1959 to June 1960.8- There were ten cases of impeachment
with a total number of 38 civil officials impeached, of whom nine
were of the selected appointment rank, sixteen of the recommended
appointment rank and thirteen of the designated appointment rank."
All ten cases were referred to the Committee on the Discipline of
Public Functionaries, with two of them also referred to civil courts.
Censures filed by the Control Yuan in that year totaled sixteen,
with 56 persons censured, among whom 54 were civil officials of the
selected, recommended and designated appointment categories, and
two were military officers. All cases were referred to offices to which
the accused belonged, with three cases being concurrently referred to
civil courts.
In that same period corrective measures proposed by the Control
Yuan numbered fifteen. All but one were addressed to the Executive
Yuan, with four proposals pertaining to domestic affairs, two per-
taining to finance, three pertaining to economic affairs, two pertain-
ing to education, three pertaining to judicial affairs and one pertaining
to overseas Chinese affairs.
Complaints from the people in that period alone amounted to
3,155 cases. Disposition of these was as follows: 351 cases led to
investigations conducted by the Yuan; 791 cases led to investigations
conducted by other interested agencies; 219 cases were forwarded to
the Committees of the Yuan; 975 cases were forwarded for reference
in other cases; 56 cases were sent back to the complainants; 130 cases
were forwarded to correct receivers and 633 cases were kept on file.
As for investigations started on the Control Yuan's initiative, there
were 493 cases, of which 335 cases were conducted by members of the
Control Yuan, 61 cases by investigators of the Control Yuan, and
132 cases by other persons designated by the Control Yuan. And
as far as the objects of these investigations are concerned, 65 cases
pertained to Yuans, Ministries and Commissions, 113 cases pertained
84. The figures are found in the CHINA YuAR BooK 1950-1961 at 200-05
(1961).
85. The Chinese civil service system, roughly speaking, has four ranks: the
special appointment officials such as ministers, the selected appointment officials
such as department chiefs of Ministries, the recommended appointment officials
such as section chiefs of Ministries and the designated appointment officials such
as ordinary clerks.
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to the Taiwan Provincial Government, 214 cases pertained to counties
and municipalities, 45 cases pertained to civil courts, 48 cases per-
tained to military courts and 8 cases pertained to "others."
IV. THE CONTROL YUAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO LAW
While the primary function of the Control Yuan is to serve as a
watchdog of the government, it has made a valuable contribution to
law and the legal system through its demands for interpretation of
the Constitution and laws. According to the Chinese Constitution, the
powers of interpretation of the Constitution and unified interpreta-
tion of laws and ordinances are entrusted to the Judicial Yuan's
Council of Grand Justices. 8 Section I of art. 4 of the Law Govern-
ing the Council of Grand Justices provides that an organization of the
Central Government or of a local government may request an interpre-
tation of the Constitution under one of the following circumstances:
(1) when it entertains any doubt in the application of the Constitu-
tion involved in the exercise of its powers, (2) when it comes into
conflict with some other organization in the application of the Con-
stitution involved in the exercise of their respective powers, (3) when
it entertains any doubt as to whether the law or ordinance it is to
apply contravenes the Constitution. The Control Yuan has rather
frequently made such requests, and the results have often enhanced
the administration of justice and the protection of civil liberties.
A few instances in recent years may be cited in illustartion of this.
1. When doubt was raised over the application of cases of flagrante
delicto as referred to in certain articles of the Constitution, the Con-
trol Yuan requested and obtained an interpretation from the Judicial
Yuan's Council of Grand Justices, which rendered clear the meaning
of such cases of flagrante delicto as referred to in the various articles
of the Constitution.-
2. There has been doubt as to whether the present system of plac-
ing the high courts and district courts under the Ministry of Justice
of the Executive Yuan is in conflict with the Constitution, which
explicitly provides in Art. 77 that the Judicial Yuan shall be the
highest judicial organ of the State and shall have charge of civil,
criminal and administrative cases and over cases concerning dis-
ciplinary measures against public functionaries. The Control Yuan
therefore requested several times that an interpretation be given by
the Council of Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan. As a result of such
requests, the Council of Grand Justices finally ruled that the courts
86. CONSTITUTION arts. 78, 79.
87. The articles concerned are 33, 74 & 102. Interpretation of Council of
Grand Justices, SHIH TZE No. 90.
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should be placed under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Yuan in con-
formity with the provisions of the Constitution.""
3. Following a discussion at its 1958 annual meeting as to whether
the Law Governing Punishment of Police Offences and the Publica-
tion Law are in contravention of the Constitution, the Control Yuan
decided that the Council of Grand Justices should be requested to
interpret the following two points:
(i) Whether punishment of individuals by police authorities
provided in the Law Governing Punishment of Police Of-
fences is at violence with Art. 8 of the Constitution. 9
(ii) Whether cancellation or revocation of registration or suspen-
sion of publication for a special period of time should be
subject to court decrees.90
The raising of these issues, which are yet to be settled by the Grand
Justices, is enough to show the Control Yuan's concern over the rights
and liberties of the people as well as its capability to ensure the safe-
guarding of them.
V. THE CONTROL YUAN AND THE COURTS
It has been mentioned before that the Control Yuan's exercise of
its powers depends upon a number of other organizations for its com-
pletion, such as the National Assembly and the Committee on the
Discipline of Public Functionaries. However, inasmuch as many
cases that come within the jurisdiction of the Control Yuan may also
be brought before the courts, the relationship between the Control
Yuan and the courts is an interesting one. In the following, we shall
deal with the Control Yuan's relation to ordinary courts and to the
Administrative Court.
A. The Control Yuan and Ordinary Courts
When the Control Yuan files an impeachment or a censure against
a public functionary of the Central Government or a local government
for violation of law or neglect of duty, it is in the position of a "prose-
cutor" only. The trial and judgment of the case rest either with the
88. Interpretation of Council of Grand Justices, SHIH TzE No. 86.
89. Article 8 of the Constitution provides, among other things, that no person
shall be tried or punished other than by a law court in accordance with the pro-
cedure prescribed by law.
90. By article 36 of the Publication Law of 1958, a competent authority in
the Central Government, or in a local government if it finds a publication in
violation of the provisions of the Publication Law, may by an administrative
measure cancel its registration or enforce suspension of publication for a cer-
tain period of time.
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National Assembly or with the Committee on the Discipline of Public
Functionaries. But, in both instances, the punishments which may be
imposed by these related organizations are always limited to such
disciplinary measures as recall, dismissal, suspension, demotion, re-
duction in salary, demerits and reprimand. If, however, the public
functionary concerned is at the same time guilty of a crime or an of-
fence against criminal law, the trial and judgment of that part of the
case rest exclusively with ordinary courts.' Such a case may be dis-
covered by the Control Yuan when it is first being filed as an impeach-
ment or a censure, or by the disciplinary organization when it is being
tried . 2 At either time, the case may be directly turned over to the
competent court.93 In this connection, the position of the Control Yuan
or the disciplinary organization is only that of an "informer." The
decision to prosecute lies completely with the procurator of the
court.94 If, after preliminary investigation, the procurator deems that
there are insufficient grounds for believing an offence has been com-
mitted, he may make a ruling "not to prosecute" and the case cannot
be tried.95
In this respect, the Chinese Control Yuan again differs from the
Western systems, including the Scandinavian Ombudsman. In West-
ern democracies an impeachment which the lower house files against
an official suspected of a criminal offense, may be used by the upper
house or a competent court" as basis for conducting a trial and mak-
ing a decision imposing penal sanction. In the case of the Swedish
Ombudsman, a prosecution brought by him against an official
suspected of a criminal offence is also enough for an ordinary court
to conduct a trial and to pass a judgment.9 7 The Danish Ombudsman
would have to order public authorities to institute criminal pro-
ceedings first,9 8 which seems to bear some resemblance to the Chinese
Control Yuan.
When a certain act of a public functionary is already under criminal
investigation or being tried in a criminal court, no disciplinary pro-
cedure concernng the same act shall be started by the Control Yuan.*
91. CONSTITUTION arts. 98, 99.
92. Control Law art. 15; Law for the Discipline of Public Functionaries art.
22, supra note 46, at 3055.
93. Ibid.
94. CODE OF CRmn uNAL PRoCEDURE art. 243 (1945).
95. Id. at arts. 231, 24f.
96. BELGIAN CoNsT. art. 90.
97. Jigerskild, The Swedish Ombudsman, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1077, 1082, 1087
(1961).
98. Christensen, The Danish Ombudsman, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1100, 1114 (1961).
99. Law for the Discipline of Public Functionaries art. 23, supra note 46, at
3055.
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And if a certain act of a public functionary is already in disciplinary
procedure, the beginning of criminal procedure concerning the same
act temporarily halts the disciplinary procedure until a final criminal
judgment is pronounced.100 However, if a ruling "not to prosecute"
or a judgment of "exempt from prosecution" or "not guilty" is pro-
nounced by the court concerning a certain act of a public functionary,
disciplinary measures concerning the same act may be imposed in-
dependently.11 Disciplinary action may also be taken against a pub-
lic functionary for an act concerning which a judgment of "punish-
ment remitted" has been pronounced or a judgment to serve sentence
has been pronounced without depriving civil rights.10 2
The action of an ordinary court on a criminal charge will not af-
fect the disciplinary organization's application of its own sanctions
except that the disciplinary procedure may not begin or continue if
the case is under trial or pending final decision in a criminal court.
The independence of the disciplinary organization is insured, but its
decisions will probably be affected by the prior decision of the court.
Here the Chinese system again differs from the United States system
in that the United States Senate upon conviction in an impeachment
removes the official from office, and he may then be indicted and tried
for the criimnal offense. 103
Another aspect of the relationship between the Control Yuan
and ordinary courts is that all ranks of judicial officials, including
judges and procurators from the supreme court down to district
courts, are subject to the censorial power of the Control Yuan.0 4
This is different from the Danish Ombudsman who has no control
over court personnel, 10 5 but similar to the Swedish Ombudsman whose
surveillance over the courts is an important role of the Office.106
Therefore, for example, if a judge in handling a case is deemed by
the Control Yuan as having been in violation of law, it may take
action against him at any time, although the Control Yuan has no
say at all about the substance of a court decision. However, in recent
years there have been times when the Control Yuan has regarded
a court decision as being the result of faulty handling, while the
court has maintained that it was purely a matter of opinion of law.
A striking example was the Control Yuan's impeachment in 1960 of
100. Law for the Discipline of Public Functionaries art. 24, supra note 46, at
3055.
101. Law for the Discipline of Public Functionaries art. 25, supra note 46, at
3055.
102. Ibid.
103. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3.
104. CONSTITUTION arts. 81, 99.
105. Christensen, supra note 98, at 1106.
106. J~gerskild, supra note 97, at 1094-95.
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five supreme court judges on grounds of incriminating an innocent
by intentional distortion of law, which though unsuccessful in impos-
ing any disciplinary punishment on the five judges, actually caused
a reversal of the court's decision.10 7
A word may be added here concerning the military courts. When
a case of impeachment or censure is found to involve military criminal
law rather than military discipline, it must be referred for trial
to a competent military court by the Control Yuan.108
B. The Control Yuan and the Administrative Court
The Chinese legal system has a separate court for the adjudication
of administrative suits. 0 9 Though basically patterned after the
European system found in France and Germany, the Chinese Ad-
ministrative Court varies from its archetypes in that it, being a
component part of the Judicial Yuan, is more judicatory. This is evi-
denced by the structure of the court. Headed by a President, the Ad-
ministrative Court has several divisions, each composed of five
judges, of whom two must previously have sat on the bench of an
ordinary court.110 Access to the Administrative Court is only gained
after exhaustion of administrative remedies. Any person, on the
ground that his rights or interests have been injured by an unlawful
or improper administrative measure on the part of a central or local
government agency, first files an administrative appeal with a com-
petent organ of a higher administrative level. If he disagrees with
the decision, he then files an administrative re-appeal with a competent
organ of an even higher administrative level."' In the case in which
an individual's rights rather than his interests have been injured by
an unlawful rather than an improper administrative measure, if no de-
cision concerning the re-appeal has been given within three months
or the decision given does not satisfy him, the individual may in-
stitute administrative proceedings at the Administrative Court.12 A
supplementary action may also be brought for compensatory dam-
ages. 13 The judgment of the Administrative Court, which is final and
subject to no appeal, may (1) revoke or change the original ad-
107. For a detailed account of the case, see TSUNG TUNG FU KUNG PAO
[GAZETTE OF PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE No. 1208, March 10, of the 50th year of the
Republic of China (1961)], which contains the Decision of the Discipline Com-
mittee on the case with related documents.
108. Control Law arts. 15, 19.
109. Organic Law of the Administrative Court art. 1, COLLECTION 2857 (1945).
110. Organic Law of the Administrative Court arts. 2, 3, 4, supra note 108, at
2857.
111. Law of Administrative Appeal arts. 1, 2, COLLECTION 3054 (1941).
112. Law of Administrative Proceedings art. 1, supra note 112, at 3054.
113. Law of Administrative Proceedings art. 2, supra note 112, at 3054.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1963/iss4/1
CHINESE CONTROL YUAN
ministrative measure or decision or (2) dismiss the proceedings as
groundless.214
If the Control Yuan deems a particular administrative measure of
a government agency unlawful or improper, it can take action against
the officials concerned on its own initiative even if the individual af-
fected by the measure has not filed an appeal or a re-appeal or in-
stituted administrative proceedings. As long as the complaint of an
individual is against the faulty handling of his business on the part of
the personnel of a government agency and not the substance of the
agency's decision, the Control Yuan may also act without waiting
for exhaustion of administrative remedies or a judgment of the Ad-
ministrative Court.
Finally, as the judges of the Administrative Court themselves, like
the judges of ordinary courts, are also under the censorial power of
the Control Yuan, what is true of the relationship between the Con-
trol Yuan and the ordinary courts in this respect is equally true of
that between the Control Yuan and the Administrative Court.
VI. POLITICAL AND OTHER QUESTIONS
The establishment of an independent Control Yuan is primarily
to free control officials from becoming involved in political strife, a
phenomenon quite common in Western parliamentary systems. How-
ever, inasmuch as the Control Yuan is composed of members chosen
by election and there in fact exist besides the dominating Nationalist
Party (Kuomintang), two other political parties, viz.: the Demo-
cratic Socialist Party and the Youth Party, each having its own
members in the Control Yuan as well as in the Government, it may
well be asked whether the Control Yuan also gets itself involved in
party quarrels and other political conflicts.
As far as disputes between parties are concerned, they have not
presented any problem to the Control Yuan. Because the percentage
of membership of the two minority parties in the Control Yuan and
the government is very low, there is little or no need for the majority
party to use the power of control as a political weapon against the
minority parties. On the other hand, there is little or no possibility for
the minority parties to do the same against the majority party.
To the extent that the Control Yuan has become involved in politi-
cal conflicts, these have been disputes between the Control Yuan and
other government organizations over the exercise of the former's
powers. A good example may be found in the Control Yuan's im-
peachment of O.K. Yui, one-time President of the Executive Yuan." 5
The impeachment was brought about as a result of Yui's repeated re-
114. Law of Administrative Proceedings arts. 3, 23, supra note 112, at 3054.
115. Decision of Committee on Discipline of Public Functionaiies, supra note
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fusal to appear before the Control Yuan to answer questions con-
cerning an earlier corrective measure directed against the Executive
Yuan."6 Personal enmity may have been involved, but the genuine
problem was whether the Control Yuan has the power to summon the
President of the Executive Yuan for questioning, or whether the
President of the Executive Yuan has the duty or responsibility to be
personally present at the Control Yuan's meeting to answer its ques-
tions. -17 As far as the letter of the Chinese Constitution is concerned,
the Executive Yuan is only responsible to the Legislative Yuan in
that the President of the Executive Yuan has the duty not only to
present to the Legislative Yuan a statement of its administrative
policies and a report of its administration, but also to answer inter-
pellation and questioning while the Legislative Yuan is in session.118
Nothing, however, is said in the Constitution about the relationship
between the Executive Yuan and the Control Yuan.
Another example of interest was the Control Yuan's battle with
the Legislative Yuan over the right of representation to the Inter-
parliamentary Union. It started with the Inter-parliamentary Union's
invitation to the Legislative Yuan several years ago, asking the latter
to participate in the organization. Upon hearing of this, the Control
Yuan put in the claim that judging from the fact that the Control
Yuan's members are elected and that its powers consist of those of
consent, impeachment and auditing, it bears similarities to the upper
house of a Western parliament, particularly to the Senate of the
United States Congress, and therefore should join the Legislative
Yuan in representing China in the Inter-parliamentary Union. When
the Legislative Yuan refused to join forces, the relationship between
the two Yuan became very tense. The conflict was further complicated
when the National Assembly cut in and claimed that being an elected
body for exercising the political powers on behalf of the people of the
whole nation, it also is a component part of a "Chinese Parliament."
The issue was finally settled by an interpretation of the Judicial
Yuan's Council of Grand Justices, which ruled that the National As-
116. The Control Yuan was further enraged when Yui rejected the former's
investigation of certain documents of the Central Bank of which he was con-
currently governor.
117. In fact, to meet the Control Yuan's claim that its power of investigation
may demand any official including the President of the Executive Yuan to be
at a designated place including the Control Yuan itself for questioning, Yui
used as his final weapon the nonexistence of his constitutional duty to appear be-
fore a Control Yuan meeting to answer questions concerning the administration
of the Executive Yuan. See Yui's written defense contained in Decision of Com-
mittee on Discipline of Public FunctionaWes, supra note 82.
118. CONSTITUTION art. 57.
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sembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan jointly are
equivalent to the Parliament or Congress of Western democracies. 1 9
Disputes of the above kinds have their basic causes. The permanent
Constitution of China adopted in 1947, when there was urgent need of
quieting down the political commotion in the country, falls short to
no small extent of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's well-systematized constitutional
theory. As a result, the Chinese Central Government structure which
would have been novel and complicated enough if wholly based on
Dr. Sun's theory, becomes even more intricate as embodied in the
present Constitution. This is reflected in the fact that the relations
among the five Yuan and the spheres for the exercise of their re-
spective powers are in many places left undefined, thus giving rise to
controversies. It is believed that if more time and full opportunity be
given, a satisfactory practical relationship among the various depart-
ments of the Central Government will be worked out.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the governmental system based upon the political doctrine of
separation of five powers, the Chinese Control Yuan is a Central
Government organization entrusted with the power of control which
it can exercise independently and exclusively. As a system of control
over government it is unique in many respects. However, it is not
impossible to make some kind of a comparison between the Chinese
Control Yuan and Western systems. The Control Yuan bears some
resemblance in structure and powers to the upper house of a Western
parliament. The Control Yuan in fighting for the right of representa-
tion to the Inter-parliamentary Union several years ago used this
comparison to support its claims.120
However, a closer examination of the Control Yuan's major func-
tions and powers as well as the procedure for exercising them re-
veals distinctive characteristics. The Control Yuan's functions and
powers are very extensive. Not only can it impeach or censure all
ranks of government personnel in the civil and military services, but it
can also propose corrections for administrative measures which it
deems unlawful or inappropriate. Corrective proposals are not limited
to particular government actions, but may be directed towards govern-
ment policies. The Control Yuan may even suggest positive actions
in matters which have, in its opinion, escaped the attention of the
government.'2 ' The Control Yuan's power of investigation as a neces-
sary correlate to the powers of impeachment, censure and proposal of
119. Interpretation of Council of Grand Justices, SHIH TZE No. 76 and ap-
pended documents.
120. Ibid.
121. For instance, the Control Yuan recently passed resolutions requesting
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corrective measures is very broad. All public records except those con-
cerning national defense and diplomatic secrets are subject to its in-
spection, and all government personnel concerned are subject to its
questioning. Many cases of impeachment and censure originate in
written complaints from private citizens, but investigations started on
the Control Yuan's own initiative have also been important.
The Control Yuan can file an impeachment or a censure against
a public functionary, but it cannot conduct a trial or apply any
sanction. The right to try belongs either to the National Assembly or
the Committee on the Discipline of Public Functionaries or a com-
petent military office as the case may be. The sanctions applied,
though based on different laws, are restricted to disciplinary mea-
sures. If the case involves a criminal offense, it is referred to a
competent court for trial and judgment. The Chinese Control Yuan
differs from Western parliamentary systems, in general, but may be
likened to the Scandinavian Ombudsman in that both the Chinese
Control Yuan and the Scandinavian Ombudsman enjoy no power
to apply any sanction directly.122 All they can do is to resort to a
court for criminal proceedings or to a competent organization for
disciplinary action. However, to the present writer the Scandinavian
and Chinese offices seem to differ from each other in this connection,
both in principle and in practice. According to the literature avail-
able, the Scandinavian Ombudsman, Swedish or Danish, regards as
his normal sanction the expression of his condemnatory opinions or
"his view of the case,' ' 123 while the Chinese Control Yuan aims at
subjecting the public functionary at fault to criminal prosecution or
disciplinary measure.
The Control Yuan in exercising its constitutional powers in the past
fifteen odd years has not been free from criticism. Generally speaking,
however, it has performed its duties conscientiously as the highest
watchdog organ of the state. When the relationship of its powers and
functions to other organs of government has been clarified, the Con-
trol Yuan can contribute further to the realization of a clean and
efficient government.
the government to revive the New Life Movement, once very popular in the 1930's,
as an effective means of stopping the suspected increase in cases of violence in
the society. Central Daily News (Taipei), Oct. 28, 1962. The Danish Ombuds-
man seems to practice a similar function in that he often makes recommendations
which he deems useful to promote law and order. See Christensen, supra note
98, at 1115-16.
122. Neither the Swedish nor Danish Ombudsman can directly give the com-
plainant a remedy or impose a penalty on the government agent found guilty.
Jligerskibld, supra note 97, at 1089; Christensen, supra note 98, at 1114.
123. J~igerskil6d, supra note 97, at 1085; Christensen, supra note 98, at 1115.
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